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ABSTRACT
ADS-B is one of the significant implementation systems of
NextGen, to help pilots and air traffic controllers to create a
safer, and more efficient National Airspace System (NAS).
First, this research paper will briefly describe the ADS-B
system, its design structure, ADS-B In and ADS-B Out
systems, its efficiency both in pilot applications and in air
traffic control applications, and then discuss about the system
safety analysis. The preliminary hazard analysis and fault tree
analysis will be done for the identified and selected hazards,
and will be briefly discussed. The paper will conclude by
providing recommendations to prevent/mitigate the hazards
identified.

General Terms
Research Paper

the traffic congestion, green gas house emissions, noise, and
fuel consumption through increased energy efficiency. As a
part of NextGen to achieve the above-mentioned goals, FAA
has determined that it is essential to shift from ground-based
surveillance and navigation system to more dynamic and
accurate airborne-based systems and procedures which will
help to enhance the capacity, reduce delays, and improve the
environmental performance. Hence, as a part of NextGen
operation, the Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast
(ADS–B) system has been developed and installed worldwide.
This paper will discuss the Automatic Dependent
Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS–B), the ADS-B IN and ADS-B
OUT systems, identify the hazards related to ADS-B in
general and then analyze the human factor issues related to
ADS-B system, discuss the current safety regulations related
to ADS-B system and conclude by providing few
recommendations to mitigate the identified hazards.

Keywords
ADS-B, NextGen, human factors, safety, surveillance, PHA,
FTA.

1. INTRODUCTION
The fastest mode of transportation is the air transportation and
generally, it is considered to be safe. The United States
National Airspace System (NAS) reported that it has achieved
low accident rates since 1960 with a dramatic decrease in
major accidents (Boeing, 2016). There were approximately
3.8 billion air travelers in 2016 and the International Air
Transport Association (IATA) predicts that there will be a
3.7% annual growth rate and expects about 7.2 billion
passengers to travel by air in 2035 (International Air
Transport Association
[IATA], 2016). Meanwhile, the
worldwide traffic of air cargo is expected to grow by an
average of 4.2 percent per year over the next 20 years
(Boeing, 2016-2017). Though, the forecasted growth in both
passenger and cargo flights is expected to be nearly 5% in the
coming decades the existing air traffic management system
cannot handle this growth.
Apart from the increasing demands related to the capacity, the
United States national airspace is also under pressure to
reduce the operating costs, traffic congestion, delays, accident
rates and greenhouse gas emissions, and at the same time, it
has to ensure safety. The Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) has to address the current and future air traffic
congestion, and it is also poised to handle the future demand.
To handle these issues efficiently, FAA has been developing
the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)
with the purpose of changing the way the NAS operates.
NextGen will meet future demand and support the economic
viability of the air transportation system. It will improve the
safety and support environmental initiatives such as reducing

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
An online literature search was carried out using Google
Scholar, Science Direct, Hunt Library of Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University, Web of Science and Federal
Aviation Administration website. The database was filtered to
collect the appropriate data related to the Automatic
Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS–B) system, related
hazards, and its role in the success of the aviation industry.
System safety is important to the development of any system
mainly to reduce the risks, protect lives and resources by
preventing mishaps. The foremost aim of system safety is on
hazards analysis and it is important to collect and record the
information, such as “the prime hazard causal factors (e.g.,
hardware failure, software error, human error, etc.), the major
mishap category for the hazard (e.g., fire, inadvertent launch,
physical injury, etc.), and any safety critical (SC) factors that
will be useful for subsequent analysis (e.g., SC function, SC
hardware item, etc.)” (Ericson, 2015). Based on this system
safety aim, the hazards related to ADS-B were identified and
a Preliminary Hazard Analysis was conducted using the
methodology obtained from MILSTD-882E for System Safety
(Department of Defense [DOD], 2012). The identified ADS-B
system hazards were organized on the basis of the checklist
provided in the book Risk Assessment: Theory, Methods, and
Applications by Rausand (Rausand, 2011, p. 67) and the
format of the table is adapted from the textbook Hazard
Analysis Techniques for System Safety by Erickson (2015).
Hazard Risk Assessment Matrix was adapted from MILSTD882E for System Safety (DOD, 2012). As the ADS-B system
is very complex, out of the different hazard categories
identified, this paper discusses only the hazards that occur due
to human error especially three hazards namely pilot error,
ATC error, and error that occurs due to miscommunication of
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both was further analyzed using the fault tree analysis
methodology (Ericson, 2015).

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Automatic Dependent Surveillance–
Broadcast (ADS–B)
The most advanced surveillance technology in the aviation
industry is the Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast
(ADS–B) system. The term ADS-B refers to Automatic – A
system which transmits information without the input from
pilot and ATC; Dependent – the information transmitted with
regard to the position, altitude, and velocity of the aircraft is
dependent on the global positioning system (GPS) and on the
navigation avionics of the aircraft; Surveillance – It provides a
method for determining various aspects of the aircraft’s
position and intent; and Broadcast – The information
transmitted is available to anyone with suitable receiving
equipment (Civil Aviation Safety Authority [CASA], 2012).

information to the ADS-B emitter. While the ADS-B avionics
system encode and transmit ADS-B messages and the
function of Antenna for ADS-B, Transponder, and GPS is to
support both ADS-B IN and OUT i.e., to support ADS-B
OUT, a single antenna is required at the bottom of the aircraft
and to support ADS-B IN, two antennas are required (one at
the top and one at the bottom of the aircraft). Antenna
Duplexer enables to share the antenna between the
transponder and ADS-B unit. Barometric altimeter develops
the aircraft altitude, and the Altitude Encoding Altimeter
organizes the information about the altitude that is transmitted
by the ADS-B message and altitude transmitted by the
transponder. Control Panel permits the pilot to key in the
inputs and select aircraft identification, emergency pulse etc.
and FMS helps to manage the flight plan (FAA, 2017,b).
Based on these components ADS-B is classified into two
main subsystems namely ADS-B IN and ADS-B OUT (Fig.1).

ADS-B is the major component of NextGen as it is intended
to move air traffic control (ATC) to a satellite-derived aircraft
location system from a radar-based system. The ADS-B
technology creates a more precise surveillance interface
between an aircraft and the ATC based on the combination of
the positioning source of the aircraft, avionics equipment and
the infrastructure on ground (Federal Aviation Administration
[FAA], 2017, a). ADS-B equipment is an advanced
surveillance system with air to air, and air to ground
applications. It involves two main components namely the
Airport Surface Detection System–Model X (ASDE-X) and
Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC) ground
surveillance systems. These two systems link ADS-B with
other surveillance technologies and this facilitates the ATC to
track the aircraft movement on ground and airport ground
vehicles. It provides more precise information to both pilots
and air traffic controllers to keep the aircraft safely separated
on runways and in the sky (FAA, 2017, a).

3.1 ADS-B System Design
The ADS-B system consists of both airborne and ground
components. The ground components are GPS (Global
Positioning System) Clock, ADS-B receiver, and antenna,
ADS-B situational display and communication link. The
function of ADS-B receiver and the antenna is to receive the
messages broadcast from aircraft, while the communication
link transmits the messages to the surveillance data processing
unit of the air traffic control from the ground station. The
function of ADS-B situation display is to exhibit the position
of the aircraft and to indicate the vector just like the radarbased surveillance system (CASA, 2012). The ADS-B
airborne infrastructure consists of the navigational source the
GPS, ADS-B Avionics (standalone box for UAT), Control
Panel, Barometric Altimeter, Altitude Encoding Altimeter,
Antenna for ADS-B, Transponder, and GPS, Antenna
Duplexer, and Flight Management System (FMS) (FAA,
2017,b). The function of GPS is to collect and broadcast the
position of the aircraft position and indicate the vector

3.2 ADS-B IN and ADS-B OUT Systems
The basic design of ADS-B consists of two subsystems such
as “ADS-B IN” and “ADS-B OUT”. ADS-B OUT is the part
of the system that transmits the data about the aircraft such as
its altitude, airspeed, velocity, and location, to the ADS-B
ground stations and the avionics, is shown in Fig.2.

While ADS-B IN is the receiving part which when equipped
in an aircraft interpret the data received from other aircraft on
an electronic flight bag in the cockpit. This system requires
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ADS-B OUT system with an “in” capability receiver
(Houston, 2017). To enhance the efficiency along with the
receiver part some aircraft are also equipped with CDTI
(Cockpit Display Traffic Information) (CASA, 2012) and
their related avionics is illustrated clearly in Fig.3.

applications which includes the Traffic Information Services –
Broadcast (TIS-B), Flight Information Services – Broadcast
(FIS-B), ADS-B in Interval Management Applications, In
Trail Procedures, Traffic Awareness System and (2) ADS-B
in Air Traffic Control applications, which is briefly described
below.

3.3.1 ADS-B in Pilot Applications

3.3 Efficiency of ADS-B system
Capezzuto (2005), Director of Surveillance and Broadcast
Services, FAA, classified the efficiency / capability of ADSB system into four types namely (i) Air to Air application which transmits data from one aircraft to another in the air
and hence improves the separation standards, improves low
visibility approaches, enhances see and avoid, and enhances
operations for en route air to air, (ii) Air to Ground
applications i.e., applications that require the transmission of
the data from an aircraft to fixed ground users which enhances
both radar and non-radar airspace surveillance coverage area,
(iii) Ground to Ground application which transmits data from
aircraft/vehicle to others on the ground which in turn
improves the taxiway navigation and ultimately improves
surface traffic management, and (iv) Ground to Air self –
contained application which transmits the weather information
to the cockpit which in turn reduces of controlled flight into
terrain (Capezzuto, 2005).
These applications were categorized into three groups by
Results Through Collaboration in Aviation (RTCO, 2002).
They are
1) Ground-based surveillance applications such as ATC
surveillance in airspace with radar and non-radar coverage,
surface surveillance at the airport, and aircraft derived data for
ground-based ATM tools.
2) Aircraft-based surveillance applications – (i) increases the
situational awareness by enhancing the visual acquisition of
traffic, enhancing traffic awareness on the airport surface,
during flight operations and by enhancing the successive
visual approaches. (ii) improves the airborne separation by
enhancing the in trail procedure and merging the operations.
3) Other applications such as ramp control/gate management,
monitoring the noise, enhances the situational awareness of
obstacles and Search and Rescue (SAR) operation.
On the other hand, FAA (FAA, 2017 c) classified these
applications in different perspective i.e., (1) ADS-B in Pilot

In the cockpit, ADS-B offers more safety and efficiency by
providing up to the second information about traffic, and
weather, through the ADS-B In receivers that can receive
UAT broadcasts (FAA, 2017 c). It offers two broadcast
services namely Traffic Information Services – Broadcast
(TIS-B) and Flight Information Services – Broadcast (FIS-B).
TIS-B increases the situational awareness of the pilots by
broadcasting the accurate real-time traffic position reports that
are relevant to the aircraft which is properly equipped. As the
data is displayed to both the pilots and ATC they have shared
situational awareness. FIS-B is available only to those aircraft
which can receive data over 978 MHz (UAT) (FAA, 2017, c).
It spontaneously transmits weather information such as
turbulence, lightning, icing, and cloud tops based on both
national and regional focus to all equipped aircraft. This realtime aeronautical and weather information helps the pilots to
efficiently plan a safe flight path and during the flight, it helps
them to make strategic decisions to avoid the hazardous
weather conditions.
In Interval Management Applications, ADS-B increases the
situational awareness of the crew by providing guidance
regarding the speed which helps the crew to maintain an
interval from target aircraft and fly safely. This is more
effective in air traffic control at the oceanic regions, en route,
and at terminals. As it provides efficient direct flight path, and
low-variance spacing between aircraft it reduces the fuel burn,
noise, and emissions (CASA, 2012). In Trail Procedures (ITP)
is an advanced ADS-B In application which allows the
aircraft to fly at ideal flight levels. It also increases the fuel
economy, reduces the emission by avoiding the turbulent
altitudes. ADS-B Traffic Awareness System (ATAS) helps to
detect the potential traffic encounters, alert the pilots and thus
reduces the air collisions to a greater extent (Richards, Brien,
& Miller, 2010).

3.3.2 ADS-B in Air Traffic Control applications
The real-time accuracy of the data provided by ADS-B
enhances safety by helping the air traffic controllers to
efficiently and effectively manage the air traffic for improved
safety and capacity (FAA], 2017 d). These services are
provided through Wide Area Multilateration (WAM), Airport
Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC), and Advanced
Surveillance Enhanced Procedural Separation (ASEPS).
WAM can be installed in areas where radar service is
unavailable or limited. It is a ground-based surveillance
system that offers surveillance outside the range of radar
coverage. It enhances the efficiency, safety, and capacity by
reducing the flight delays, diversions, cancellations, and fuel
emissions (FAA, 2017 d). ASSC increases situational
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awareness in all kinds of weather by improving the
surveillance at the airport surface. It plays a significant role in
preventing the runway collisions, helps to correlate the
information regarding the flight-plan with real-time position
displays and provides accurate surveillance data (FAA, 2017
e).
The subsequent level of NextGen is the Advanced
Surveillance Enhanced Procedural Separation (ASEPS)
project. Its aim is to improve the oceanic surveillance. FAA is
evaluating two methodologies to improve the surveillance
coverage in oceanic regions through Space-Based ADS-B
reports and more frequent Automatic Dependent Surveillance
– Contract (ADS-C) reports (FAA, 2017 f). Space-Based
ADS-B is an approach to move from the present system of
ADS-B ground stations to radios hosted on satellites, which
will enable enhanced surveillance across the entire globe
(FAA, 2017 f). It will help to track the aircraft that might fly
anywhere in near real-time and will increase the safety and
efficiency for all users. It will also reduce the separation
standards in oceanic airspace and improve precise approach in
non-radar airspace and provide accurate and real time
information for search and rescue operations (FAA, 2017 f).

3.4 System Safety Analysis of ADS-B
As discussed ADS-B offers a lot of advantages like enhancing
the efficiency of airspace capacity and usage by the efficient
use of runways, increases the safety by providing real-time
information regarding the aircraft position, velocity etc. to
both pilots and ATC. It automatically provides traffic callouts and provides warnings of an upcoming potential runway
incursion. In addition, the implementation, and maintenance
of the system is cost efficient compared with the radar-based
system. It is efficient in areas where radar is unavailable or
ineffective, and increases the situational awareness, and
reduces the workload (CASA, 2012 and Richards, Brien, &
Miller, 2010, p. 7-10). Due to the complete surveillance
technology for commercial operators, it provides both fuel
and time savings (FAA, 2017, a), enables the airlines to fly
direct routes and reduce the ticket cost per passenger by flying
at more efficient altitudes and speeds with uninterrupted
climbs and descents. It also reduces the environmental impact
by decreasing the emissions from engines, reduces the noise
through continuous descent and curved approaches (Richards
et al., 2010).
Today’s systems are highly complex with human-machine
interface, machine-machine interface and prone to hazards
that results in mishaps. ADS-B is one such highly complex
system. The ADS-B specific components such as ADS-B IN
and ADS-B OUT are integrated to develop a complete system
which is dependent on external systems such as navigation
systems, communication, and different operators/consumers.
As different systems are interlinked with each other there is a
probability for errors and failures to occur at any stage/
system such as navigation system, avionic components that
are both air borne and those that are at the ground stations,

data linking and processing unit, transmission, reception etc.
Hence system safety is is important for any type of project.
Ericson (2015) defined system safety as the “process of
managing the system, personnel, environmental, and health
mishap risks encountered in the design development, test,
production, use, and disposal of systems, subsystems,
equipment, materials, and facilities”. The main aim is to
eliminate the hazards that might result in the loss of the
system, injury, death, and environmental damage. The main
intention of system safety is the mishap risk management by
identifying the hazards and mitigating them.
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is defined as a safety
analysis tool that is used for identifying hazards, related
causal factors and hazardous effects, risk level, and which
provides mitigating design measures (Ericson, 2015). PHA
evaluates the system design at the preliminary level without
comprehensive information and it comes under the
Preliminary Design Hazard Analysis Type (PD-HAT). The
main aim of the PHA is to analyze the hazards that are
identified in the Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) and to
identify previously unrecognized hazards early in the system
development. It identifies the hazard causal factors,
consequences, and relative risk associated with the initial
design concept. The PHA is applicable to the “analysis of all
types of systems, facilities, operations, and functions and can
be performed on a unit, subsystem, system, or an integrated
set of systems” (Ericson, 2005, p. 74).
Based on FAA’s Capstone Safety Engineering Report #1 ADS-B Radar-Like Services (FAA, 2000), FAA’s Capstone
Phase II RNAV Preliminary Hazard Analysis Status Report
(FAA, 2003), and the Capability Safety Assessment report
(Joint Planning and Development Office [JPDO], 2012) the
hazards relate to ADS-B were identified, and preliminary
hazard list (PHL) was prepared. Based on the PHL the
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) was conducted for the
hazards related to ADS-B IN Avionics hazards, ADS-B OUT
Ground hazards, ADS-B OUT Avionics hazards,
Environmental Hazards and hazards that occur due to human
error and the results of PHA alone were provided in Table 1.
As the ADS-B system is very complex, out of the different
hazard categories identified, this paper discusses only the
hazards that occur due to human error especially three hazards
namely pilot error, ATC error, and error that occurs due to
miscommunication of both and was further analyzed using the
fault tree analysis methodology (Ericson, 2015).
Fig.4 represents the Fault Tree Analysis of Loss of separation
that might occur due to the error in aircraft, ground station
(ATC) and miscommunication between air and ground
operations. With regard to the loss of separation, the causes
were related to the error that occurs in aircraft due to pilot,
error that might occur due to miscommunication between pilot
and ATC and error that occur in ground station due to ATC.
All the links are connected with an OR node as any of those
factors can cause the loss of separation.
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Table.1. Preliminary Hazard Analysis of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast System
Generic Hazard Evaluation (PHA)
System : Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast System
No
Hazard description
Cause
Effect
ADS-B IN Avionics Hazards
IN AVH Loss of data which
1
might affect the
ADS-B IN
application.
IN AVH
2
Aircraft position
might not be correct.

IM
RI

Preventive actions /
Mitigation

FMRI

Back up Ground radar
station/ On board
establishment of ADS-B
receiver.
Regular maintenance
Ground Radar
station/Development of
GPS Based back tools
Regular calibration and
maintenance/backbone
ATC Radar Stations
Use ATC Radar Stations

3C

Reboot the system. A
second Back up system
like IPAD with Flash
Memory is recommended
Use Manual Nav Aids
like GPS. For route
mapping/Regular testing
of the software, identify
the bug that cause the
error and resolve the issue
by debugging.
Provide efficient and
comprehensive training to
the crew/engage Auto
pilot

3D

Failure of aircraft’s
ADS-B receiver.

Situational awareness will
be reduced.

1D

Receiver antenna
collapses.

ADS-B might provide
wrong navigational aids
and result in false
situational awareness.
Situational awareness will
be reduced.

1C

IN AVH
3

Loss of data to ADSB IN application.

Receiver antenna
malfunction.

IN AVH
4

Track of aircraft
might not be
displayed to the pilot.

Situational awareness will
be reduced & affect pilot.

1B

IN AVH
5

System hangs
suddenly.

Failure of the
systems that
connects ADS-B
receiver and other
application systems
Failure of CDTI
display

Situational awareness will
be reduced & affect pilot.

1C

IN AVH
6

Aircraft position
might not be correct.
May remain for a
long time.

Malfunction of the
ADS-B report
assembly systems.

ADS-B might provide
wrong navigational aids
and result in false
situational awareness.

1B

IN AVH
7

Related to human
factor/error.

Pilots lack of
experience about the
system
functionalities

Results in undesirable
events.

2C

Power supply failure

ATC has to reassess the
traffic by transitioning
back to procedural
control. Increases the
workload. Situational
awareness is lost.
Without the awareness of
the controller it lead to
break down in separation
and affect all the aircraft.
Without the awareness of
the controller it lead to
break down in separation
and affect all the aircraft.
ATC has to reassess the
traffic by transitioning
back to procedural
control. Increases the
workload. Situational
awareness is lost.
Without the awareness of
the controller it lead to
break down in separation
and affect all the aircraft.

2D

Back up UPS facility
should be provided.

4B

2C

Regular Firmware
updates/Anti Virus
Protection maintenance
and calibration.
Identifying & debugging
should be done to resolve
the bug that causes the
decoding error.
Provision of back up and
availability of different
links.

3B

2C

Regular maintenance and
testing.

3B

Affect all the aircraft as it
lead to incorrect intent

2B

Data verification system
should be installed.

3C

ADS-B OUT Ground Hazards
O GH 1
Loss of data which
have an impact on the
controller inputs.

O GH 2

Due to corruption it
display wrong data to
controller.

Error in the data link

O GH 3

Position of aircraft
might be affected.

Error in data
decoding process

O GH 4

Abrupt loss of data
that might affect the
controllers work.

Failure of data link
between controller
working position
and ground station

O GH 5

Due to corruption
displays incorrect
data to the controller.

Error in the ADS-B
Receiver

ADS-B OUT Avionic Hazards
O AVH Failure of GPS time
1
input will cause

Failure of GPS
Clock

1D

3D

2D

2C

3D

3C

4B

4D

3D

4B
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O AVH
2

unexpected loss of
time synchronisation.
Sends corrupted
position data to
ADSB emitter.

data.
Error in GPS
receiver unit

There might be error in
the display of the position
of the aircraft and it might
lead to break down in
separation.
ATC has to reassess the
traffic by transitioning
back to procedural
control. Increases the
workload. Situational
awareness is lost.
ATC has to reassess the
traffic by transitioning
back to procedural
control. Increases the
workload. Situational
awareness is lost.
Error with regard to the
position of the aircraft
displayed.

2C

Availability of back up
receiver.

3B

2C

Back up facility for the
navigational system on
board.

4C

3B

Back up facility for the
navigational system on
board.

4B

3C

Regular CALIBRATION
maintenance and testing.

4C

Without the awareness of
ATC it might lead to
break down in separation.

2C

Altitude quality indicator
alerts. Regular
maintenance and testing.

3D

Altitude sensing
fails

Without the awareness of
ATC it might lead to
break down in separation.

2C

Altitude quality indicator
alerts. Regular
maintenance and testing.

3D

Error in
Transponder/ ADSB emitter

Without the awareness of
ATC it might lead to
break down in separation.

2B

Installation of data
validity mechanism on
board.

3C

ATC has to reassess the
traffic by transitioning
back to procedural
control. Increases the
workload. Situational
awareness is lost.
Data related to altitude is
not transmitted. ATC
should revert back to
procedural control.
ATC has to reassess the
traffic by transitioning
back to procedural
control. Increases the
workload. Situational
awareness is lost.
Without the awareness of
ATC it might lead to
break down in separation.

3C

Back up transponder/
emitter.

4C

2C

Data from GPS can be
used as back up.

3C

3B

Back up.

4C

2D

Installation of data
validity mechanism on
board and at ground
station.
Installation of data
validity mechanism on
board and at ground
station.

3D

Identifying & debugging
should be done to resolve
the bug that causes the
decoding error.
Back up of navigation
aids on board.

3B

O AVH
3

Position data will not
be sent to ADS-B
emitter.

Malfunction of GPS
receiver

O AVH
4

Loss of ADS-B
position data affects
the controller input.

Failure of GPS
antenna

O AVH
5

Positional accuracy
will be lost.

O AVH
6

Altitude
data
transmitted to
ADS-B emitter might
be wrong.
Altitude
data
transmitted to ADS-B
emitter might be
corrupted.
Position
of
the
aircraft
displayed
might be incorrect.

Error of accuracy
performance
equipment in the
aircraft
Malfunction
of
Altitude encoder

O AVH
7

O AVH
8

O AVH
9

Loss of data which
might
affect
the
controller.

Failure of aircraft’s
transponder/emitter

O AVH
10

Altitude data not
transmitted to ADS-B
emitter.

Malfunction of
Altimeter

O AVH
11

Loss of data which
might affect the
controller.

Malfunction of
ADS-B Out Antenna

O AVH
12

Broadcasted data
might be incorrect.

Deterioration of
ADS-B Out Antenna

O AVH
13

Error in the display of
aircraft position.

Without the awareness of
ATC it might lead to
break down in separation.

2C

O AVH
14

Broadcasting of
incorrect data.

Data corruption
during transportation
might result in
broadcasting
incorrect data
Data encoding
process error

Without the awareness of
ATC it might lead to
break down in separation.

2C

O AVH
15

Total ADS-B service
loss.

Failure of Satellite

ADS-B
displayed

2B

tracks
on

not
ATC

3B

3C
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O AVH
16

Distortion of data and
interruption
of
signals.

Environmental Hazards
EH 1
Data
might
corrupted.

be

EH 2

Inaccurate data.

EH 3

Lack of data or
inaccurate data.

EH 2

Data unavailability.

Hazards due to Human error
HH 1
Data - not
broadcasted.

HH 2

HH 3

Before take-off pilot
might enter the
wrong pressure in
altimeter
Pilot enters wrong
pressure in altimeter.

HH 4

Affects
operations.

HH 5

Pilot enters wrong
pressure in altimeter.

HH 6

Attaching the label to
wrong flight.

HH 7

Incorrect
coupling
with flight plan.

HH 8

ATC might be
confused by the
values displayed
based on geometric
and barometric
levels.
ATC might apply
either radar or ADSB separation standard
to the flight plan.

HH 9

all

Interference
by
Radio Frequency

console.
Without the awareness of
ATC and pilot the error in
the aircraft position might
lead to break down in
separation.

2C

Installation of data
validity mechanism on
board and at ground
station.

3B

Aircraft external
equipment, and
outdoor equipment
at the ground station
might be affected by
the extreme weather
conditions

Lead to loss of separation
or navigation.

1B

Use GPS/Regular
maintenance and
calibration.

3A

Limited forecast of
the weather
Limited number of
weather reporting
stations
Lack of coverage

Lead to loss of separation
or navigation.
Lead to loss of separation
or navigation.

1D

Use GPS/Increasing the
facility.
Establishing more
reporting stations.

3B

Lead to loss of separation
or navigation.

2C

Increasing the area
coverage or setting up of
new reporting stations.

3B

Inappropriate use –
Pilot might set the
transponder at a
wrong mode

Increases the workload
due to the transition back
to procedural control.
Loss of situational
awareness.
Collision on ground or
air.

3B

Reminder by co-pilot or
through the navigation
document.

4B

3C

4B

Collision on ground or
air.

3C

If pilot repeats the value
or if the controller is
experienced it can be
mitigated.
Double checking the
altimeter setting.

Loss of separation.

3B

Adequate training on new
systems.

4B

Collision on ground or
air.

3C

If pilot repeats the value it
can be mitigated.

4D

Increases the workload of
the controller due to
incorrect coupling.

3D

Controller should cross
check the flight plan.

4D

Broadcasting of incorrect
data.

3D

Reminder by co-pilot or
through the navigation
document.

4B

Different display lead to
confusion.

3D

Compulsory training
regarding the function of
the ADS-B systems.

4C

Incorrect separation.

3D

Compulsory training
regarding the function of
the ADS-B systems.

4B

Lack of proficiency
– wrong pressure
adjust value given
by ATC
Lack of proficiency
– error in altimeter
setting by pilot
Lack of proficiency
– Inadequate
knowledge of ADSB system
Missed
communication
–
Pilot mishears the
pressure adjust value
given by ATC
Lack of situational
awareness by ATC –
incorrect Callsign in
flight plan
Lack of situational
awareness by Pilot –
in correct Callsign in
FMS
Confusion
–
different
altitude
sources
displayed
might confuse ATC
Confusion – Due to
radar and ADS-B
tracks ATC might be
confused

2B

3C

4D
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Loss of Separation

Error due to
miscommunication
OR node

Error in aircraft

Error in ground
station

OR node
Error from ATC

Pilot Error

OR node

Enters incorrect input to
flight control

OR node

Wake avoidance

Distraction

Data corruption,
system
malfunction

Fails to follow the
assigned 4
dimensional trajectory

OR node

Lack of
proficiency

ATC mishears/
misunderstands the
information from pilot

Pilot mishears
/misunderstands the
input from ATC

Fatigue

Traffic avoidance

Weather
avoidance

Confusion due to mixed
equipment (radar, ADS-B),
display color.

OR node

Lack of
proficiency

Distraction

Error in entering
inputs

Confusion due to mixed
equipment (radar, ADS-B)

Fig.4. FTA of the human factors of ADS-B System
The contributing factors for the pilot error were the incorrect
input entered by the pilot to the flight control and failure to
follow the assigned four-dimensional trajectory. This is linked
by OR node as any of this two can lead to loss of separation
and with regard to incorrect input to flight control the factors
that contribute together are the lack of proficiency, distraction,
fatigue and confusion of the pilot due to mixed equipment,
display color in the cockpit etc. As they contribute
individually to the mishap they are linked by OR node. While
the factors such as wake avoidance, traffic avoidance, and
weather avoidance contribute individually to the failure to

follow the assigned 4D trajectory hazard they are connected
by OR node.
The error that occurs due to miscommunication between air
and ground stations are – when pilot mishears or
misunderstands the input from ATC and vice-versa, and the
other factors are data corruption, system malfunction etc.
The error in the ground station that occurs due to ATC is the
lack of proficiency, distraction, error in entering the inputs,
and confusion due to mixed equipment such as radar and
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ADS-B. As any of these issues might lead to loss of
separation it is linked by OR node.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the PHA, the hazards that are ranked as 1B, 1C, and
1D, are unacceptable risks; those that are ranked as 2B, 2C,
and 2D are having high risk which needs more attention, and
continuous monitoring; hazards that are ranked as 3A, 3B, 3C,
and 3D have medium risks but should not be ignored while
4B, 4C, and 4 D have low risks which need occasional
inspection and maintenance. If the preventive measures
specified in this report are done properly the risks can be
reduced to a greater extent.
With regard to the hazards related to human errors analyzed
using FTA, the best recommendation would be to provide a
relevant mandatory training to both pilots and ATC officers
with regard to technology, situational awareness, awareness
about the loss of separation, safety aspects regarding the airground communications systems, decision making, and crew
resource management. Other solutions would be to encourage
and mandate both the pilot and ATC to use high quality
communication systems, Transponders (Mode C and Mode S)
and ACAS. Training can be provided with regard to ground
safety nets such as Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA), Area
Proximity Warning (APW), Minimum Safe Altitude Warning
(MSAW), and Approach Path Monitor (APM). With regard to
air-borne safety nets, training can be provided with regard to
Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), Ground
Proximity Warning System (GPWS), High Energy Approach
Monitoring Systems, and Runway Overrun Protection
Systems (ROPS). Above all, depending on their designation a
recurrent training should be mandated to prove their currency
and a type rating should be mandated for ADS-B technology
usage. If these training and ratings were implemented it would
play a major role in reducing the ADS-B related mishaps.

5. CONCLUSION
In this digital age, the aviation industry is becoming more and
more sophisticated with the emerging new technologies such
as ADS-B, Head-Up Displays (HUDs), Global Navigation
Satellite Systems (GNSS), Digital voice and Controller-Pilot
Data Link Communications (CPDLC), Cockpit Display of
Traffic Information, Textual and graphical Flight Information
Service (FIS) data link and Onboard terrain, obstacle and
noise-impacted area databases. These technologies serve as an
efficient tool in collaborative decision making when it is
integrated into Air Traffic Management (ATM) systems and
used by the pilots, and controllers. ADS-B is the new
surveillance technology which is proposed to be flight-deck
based system to support a wide range of aircraft-based
separation applications during flight operations and provide
collision avoidance protection when operating on the airport
surface.
The important issue with this technology is how the
information can be utilized effectively by different users such
as pilots, controllers, dispatchers, and vehicle operators within

their relevant responsibilities. The human factor issues are the
acceptance and utilization by pilots and controllers, building a
collaborative work ethic between pilots, controllers, and
certification authorities, and how to delegate their roles and
responsibilities for safe operation of the aircraft. Especially,
with regard to the separation process which is evaluated using
the FTA methodology in this paper, there are three approaches
that can be adapted. The first approach is that the separation
responsibility must be always with the controller. The second
approach emphasizes that with accurate real-time information
the responsibility can be shared partially between the pilot and
ATC especially during en route phase. The third approach is
that flight crew can modify and coordinate their preferred or
desired routines to the ATC for approval.
One of the common perspectives of both the pilot and
controllers about the ADS-B implementation is regarding the
responsibility. The certification authorities and the rule
making team must assign the responsibility in a way that it
will enhance the overall safety. Safety must be their main
concern in developing new policies to define the
responsibility and liability of the users. Attempts should be
made to include and insist the basic principles of situational
awareness as part of the advanced decision making training
for pilots and controllers. If the mitigation measures and
proper training suggested in this study is implemented, the
accidents that might occur due to human error can be reduced
significantly. ADS-B technology provides the chance to
reduce the separation standards, increase the efficiency and
capacity of the air space and flight operations, provides
flexibility, and enhances the situational awareness.
Simultaneously, it plays a significant role in enhancing the
environmental quality by reducing the emissions, noise and
helps to save economically by reducing the fuel cost. The real
challenge which is ahead of the aviation industry is
developing an air traffic management system by integrating
the human component and assigning the responsibilities
among pilots and controllers and making the entire system to
function efficiently.
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